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There is a curious estrangement between two scholarly communities that ought
to have a lot in common: The first studies “transformative constitutionalism”, the
second “law and development”. There is considerable thematic, geographical and
methodological overlap between the two. Yet, the two strands of scholarship do
not systematically connect. My argument in this post is that connecting the two
approaches is productive because it confronts each side with its own blind spots.
Law and development is confronted with its constitutional blind spots: namely, its
assumptions based on liberal constitutionalism, which does not hold in different
contexts shaped by other constitutional varieties.  Conversely, transformative
constitutionalism is confronted with its developmental blind spots: Namely, the limits
of court-centered rights litigation and the need to pay more attention to economic
constitutionalism and political economy. Acknowledging these mutual blind spots
opens avenues for future research that might undo some of the mutual estrangement
between the two scholarly communities.
Ships passing in the night?
At first glance, law and development (L&D) and transformative constitutionalism (TC)
seem to describe different legal phenomena and discourses. L&D is typically traced
back to attempts by US-American agencies and scholars in the 1960s and 70s to
modernize developing countries through externally assisted legal reforms inspired
by liberal legalism. TC emerged since the 1990s in largely domestic processes
of constitution-making and adjudication and is frequently conceived as a counter-
concept to “Western” liberal constitutionalism. These different genealogies and
postures may explain some of the estrangement between the two sides.
In substance, however, TC and L&D have much in common: Geographically, they
both centre on Southern jurisdictions marked by low income and high inequality.
Thematically, both are concerned with social change through law: Law and
development is “concerned with the relationship between the legal systems and
the ‘development’ – the social, economic and political changes – occurring in Third
World countries”, as per David Trubek’s seminal 1974 article. Transformative
constitutionalism denotes “an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change
through nonviolent political processes grounded in law”, as defined by Karl Klare in
his influential 1998 article. Methodologically, both share initial assumptions about the
role of lawyers and courts as agents of social change, and both had to differentiate
and contextualize these assumptions empirically with the help of interdisciplinary
methods.
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Given these parallels, L&D and TC appear like ships passing in the night: They are
sailing in the same ocean, in similar directions, but without communicating about
their respective endeavours. It is thus time to turn on the position lights – if only to
highlight each other’s blind spots.
L&D’s constitutional blind spots
Firstly, TC highlights constitutional blind spots of L&D. Until recently, there has been
relatively little engagement with constitutional foundations of L&D, and much of the
literature used to assume a liberal constitutional framework, considering the only one
to offer the conditions for capitalist development and economic growth.
The initial L&D movement purportedly failed because it was predicated on
assumptions of liberal legalism that did not hold. The 1990s revival occurred under
the banner of “rule of law”, which transported a stripped-down version of liberal
constitutionalism focused on independent judiciaries, separation of powers and
protection of property rights. Even purportedly private economic institutions are
conceived within a liberal constitutional framework: The corporation, for instance,
is conceived as an institution of private law controlled by its capital investors, the
shareholders, but this conception is in itself the result of a constitutional operation,
namely the separation of the political and economic sphere constitutive of liberal
constitutionalism and held key for market-driven economic growth.
These liberal assumptions, however, do not hold in different constitutional
contexts, shaped by different varieties of constitutionalism. For one, there
are obviously illiberal constitutional orders which offer functionally equivalent
conditions for economic development, especially China or the early East Asian
tigers. More importantly for our topic, TC posits different constitutional ends and
means of development: It does not posit economic growth as the ultimate end of
transformation, but rather emphasizes equality and inclusion. The means to achieve
these ends involve an activist, redistributive state subject to positive constitutional
obligations, state-owned enterprises and state-capitalist constitutional structures.
This also blurs the liberal separation of politics and economics, as we shall see in the
following part.
TC’s developmental blind spots
Confronting TC with insights from L&D in turn highlights the developmental blind
spots. TC initially carried a developmental promise: It pledged to transform highly
unequal, exclusionary and often authoritarian societies into more egalitarian,
inclusive and democratic polities. It thus enshrined transformative elements such
as activist constitutional courts; social rights that impose positive obligations on the
state; horizontal effect of rights among private parties; and an anti-formalist legal
and interpretive culture. Presently, however, some of the initial enthusiasm about TC
seems to be waning, as inequality persists and populist backlash looms large. L&D
points to three conceptual problems of TC as currently conceived that may need to
be tackled to go forward.
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The first problem, or blind spot, concerns the court-centrism of TC, which obscures
other actors of change. In most accounts of TC, courts are the decisive agents of
transformation. However, L&D points to the truism that courts have a limited ability to
enforce social change and depend on other actors to be transformative. Ultimately,
TC requires activism from all branches of power and from progressive social forces.
That doesn’t mean that courts are irrelevant, but de-centers them and broadens the
focus beyond social rights adjudication. In a similar vein, sophisticated L&D projects
combine legislative reform, administrative capacity building, judicial strengthening,
empowerment of civil society and work with the private sector. L&D scholarship
has developed a toolkit of interdisciplinary methods to captures these complex
interactions. This socio-legal toolkit would certainly help TC develop empirically
grounded theories of change that can inform future research on transformative legal
institutions.
The second blind spot concerns questions of economic constitutionalism, which TC
scholarship seems to neglect. There is an inverse relationship between the frequent
invocations of a telos of “economic justice”, “redistribution”, “substantive equality”,
“democratization of economic power” on the one hand, and rare discussions
about concrete transformative economic arrangements on the other.  Instead,
much of the debate seems to focus on social rights litigation that forces the state
to redistribute public resources. Much less attention is paid to what TC has to
say about the economic system and economic institutions which determine the
initial distribution in the first place. This is an omission, given that TC is not only
conceived as a transformation of the state, but also of social relations.
At closer inspection, transformative constitutions do address the economy: The
Brazilian constitution, for instance, contains an entire chapter on the economy,
with constitutional principles of economic order that lay the foundations for a mixed
economy, with a strong element of state capitalism. The constitutions of South
Africa and India seek to tame private economic power through horizontal effect of
constitutional rights, in line with the international debate on business and human
rights. On the other hand, all transformative constitutions also protect private
property rights and free enterprise to some extent, and they did not prevent past
waves of privatization and liberalization. This raises two important questions for
future research on TC: Firstly, are there some common economic elements of TC?
Or is there too much variation so that the concept of TC is ultimately economically
neutral? The second question concerns the effectiveness of these constitutional
directives for economic order. Do courts enforce these provisions in a way that
shapes economic reality? Does this matter at all in a globalized market economy?
A final blind spot concerns political economy and the interdependence of economic
and political constitutionalism. While the failures of court-centrism seem unsurprising
from a L&D perspective, the more interesting and puzzling question is why
democratic institutions and universal franchise under transformative constitutions
have not been yielding a more transformative politics. Scholars of TC often content
themselves in emphasizing that economic and political rights are “intrinsically
intertwined” (Klare 1998). But there is less reflection on structures of political
economy that impede transformation, such as legal mechanisms that translate
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economic power of entrenched elites into political power, and vice versa. This
raises eminently constitutional questions about political representation and electoral
systems, political parties and campaign finance, legislative process and public
scrutiny – in short: the “law of democracy” of TC.
Courts have a role to play in developing and enforcing this law of democracy. A
case in point is the jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court on corporate
campaign finance: In a 2015 decision, the Court constitutionally banned direct
campaign contributions by corporations, reasoning that economic power would
otherwise threaten political equality. This egalitarian thrust contrasts with the more
liberal approach of the American Supreme Court in its 2011 Citizens United decision.
How transformative this attempt at regulating political economy will be in practice
remains an important question for future research.
Conclusion
As a preliminary conclusion, we can say that confronting the blind spots of
TC highlights conceptual weaknesses of the initial concept. If it is to be truly
transformative, we cannot understand TC as the structural coupling of law and
politics only. Rather, TC describes a triangular, interdependent relationship between
the legal, political and economic system. The upshot for future research is that both
TC and L&D ought to focus more on questions of economic constitutionalism and
political economy, and thus overcome their mutual estrangement.
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